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The paper investigates how tax rates, corruption and institutional aspects of the labour 
market influence the size of the segments of the labour market such as unemployment, 
employment, self-employment and activity in the hidden economy. The novelty of our 
approach is the theoretical justification of the interaction between the perception of 
taxes and of corruption, as well as the establishment of a new concept and variable, the 
subjective tax rate. Alternative regression calculations are carried out on data for OECD 
countries for the period 1995 to 2000. The tests confirm the validity of the new variable 
and the results imply the need for a more sophisticated policy approach for influencing 
labour market outcomes.  
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Az adóráták és korrupció munkaerőpiaci hatásai: 





A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, hogy az adóráták, a korrupció elterjedtsége és különböző 
munkaerő-piaci intézmények hogyan befolyásolják a munkaerőpiac egyes 
szegmenseinek - munkanélküliek, foglalkoztatottak, önfoglalkoztatottak, a rejtett 
gazdaságban dolgozók - relatív nagyságát a fejlett piacgazdaságokban. Megközelítésünk 
újdonsága abban áll, hogy egy új fogalom és változó, a szubjektív adóráta bevezetésével 
elméletileg megalapozza az adóráták és a korrupció kölcsönhatásban való vizsgálatát. 
Az OECD országoknak az 1995-2000-es évek adatai alapján végzett regressziós 
elemzések megerősítik az új fogalom érvényességét. Az eredményekből az következik, 
hogy a gazdaságpolitika csak kifinomultabb szemlélettel képes a munkaerő-piaci 
jelenségeket célszerűen befolyásolni. 
 
Tárgyszavak 





Potential participants of the labour market regularly have the (not always freely 
available) opportunity to make decisions about joining various parts of the labour 
market. They may opt to move either to the visible segments of this market, to the 
invisible part (the hidden economy), or even to both. The visible segments include 
unemployment and employment; the latter divided to employee status and self-
employment. 
 
In the literature, empirical investigations on the determinants of national rates of 
unemployment, employment and self-employment usually the cross-country or panel 
approaches are used. These visible segments of the market are, as a rule, associated 
with the size of taxes and the nature of labour market institutions, while for the size of 
hidden activities the influence of taxes and corruption are emphasized.    
 
This study attempts to use three types of explanatory variables, tax rates, the extent of 
corruption and various institutional aspects of the labour market, for the explanation of the 
relative size of the visible and non-visible segments of the labour market in developed 
market economies and some transition countries. The novelty of our analysis is that we 
establish that the role of corruption is closely connected with that of tax rates, and the two 
effects can be combined in a new indicator, the subjective tax rate. This joint indicator is 
then taken into account not only in explaining the size of the hidden economy, but, along 
with labour market institutions, it becomes a major factor also in the explanation of cross-
country differences of unemployment, employment and self-employment.  
 
Section 2 of the study provides a brief review of the literature on the role of corruption in 
the economy, and summarizes the literature focusing on the role played by taxes and 
corruption in the emergence and development of the hidden economy. In section 3 we 
introduce the new indicator – the subjective tax rate – and analyse its structure and order 
of magnitude. Section 4 investigates the impact of the subjective tax rate (and other factors) 
on the development of the various segments of the labour market. The study concludes 
with a Summary. 
 
 
2  The role of corruption in the visible and invisible economy  
 
There are numerous definitions for the concept of corruption. According to the simplest 
definition, it is the abuse of public power for private gains. While accepting this general 
definition, we should not exclude the possibility that corruption-like behaviour exists in 
exclusively private sector activities as well. In large private enterprises, particularly where 
the managers are not the same as the owners, this phenomenon can also exists, but here 
the usual conflict between public and private interests transforms into the conflict between 
company interest and personal private interest. 
 
Theory usually differentiates between two types of corruption: small and grand 
corruption. Small corruption means the corruption of bureaucrats, tax inspectors, 
policemen, etc.. Grand corruption is connected with the attitude of politicians, 
representatives of the parliament and others (cf. Tanzi, 1998). 
In some countries corruption is widespread, while in others it is persistently low. Why do 
officials in some countries misuse public office for private gain more frequently and for 
larger payoffs than officials in other states? In answering this question various theories 
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emphasize certain historical and cultural traditions, the level of economic development, 
political institutions, government policies, or the combination of these (cf. Treisman, 2000 
and Svensson, 2005).   
 
La Porta et al. (1999) and Treisman (2000) assume that the size of corruption is directly 
related to the expected costs, benefits, or both of corrupt activities in a country. The most 
obvious cost of a corrupt behaviour is the risk that the perpetrator gets caught and 
punished. The probability of getting caught in turn depends partly on the effectiveness of 
the country’s legal system. Legal systems differ from the point of view that how much 
protection they offer to private agents harmed by corrupt acts of officials, and the 
opportunities for recourse to remedy. La Porta et al. (1999) argues that common law 
systems (found mostly in Britain and its former colonies) differ in this respect from civil 
law systems (used mostly in continental European countries and their former colonies). 
Common law originally developed in England, partly to protect the parliament and 
property owners against the harmful interventions by the sovereign to regulate and 
expropriate them. In contrast, civil law systems furthered by monarchs and rulers such as 
Napoleon and Bismarck, developed as an instrument of the sovereign to be used for state-
building and controlling economic life. La Porta et al. (1999) and Treisman (2000) 
hypothesize and show that due to greater protection of property against the intervention of 
the state, embodied in common law systems, various aspects of government performance 
improves, including the prevention from corruption. 
 
Expectations and practices concerning the enforcement of laws are as crucial as the 
original intent and formulations of laws. There is high variation across countries in terms 
of legal culture, i.e. the  relative importance of l aw in  preser ving s oc ial order. Research 
results show that in Britain and in some of its former colonies, the focus is primarily on the 
procedural aspects of law as opposed to the respect of hierarchy and the authority of 
offices. Judges are willing to follow procedures, even when the results threaten the 
hierarchy, and this obviously increases the chance that corruption by officials will be 
uncovered (cf. Treisman, 2000).   
 
Religious traditions also provide a cultural framework that conditions attitudes towards 
social hierarchy. Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam are considered more 
hierarchical religions than Protestantism, which is more egalitarian or individualistic. 
Accordingly, challenging the deeds of officeholders is less accepted in cultures influenced 
by the former than in those dominated by the latter. Another channel through which 
different religions approach the abuses of power differently is the tradition on which the 
religion in question had developed. Protestantism, due to its emergence from dissenting 
sects opposing the powerful Catholic Church, has a general disposition of readiness to 
monitor and denounce abuses of positions in a hierarchy, including the suspicious activity 
of state officials.  
 
The extent of ethnical heterogeneity is also considered to be important in allowing more 
or less room for corruption in a society. The idea is that in ethnically more heterogeneous 
societies the ethnical groups that come to power usually establish a rule that turns against 
the ethnic losers. This may take the form of physical destruction, economic expropriation, 
restriction of political freedom and access to public goods, etc.. Political theories associate 
higher ethnic heterogeneity in a society with governments becoming more interventionist 
and less efficient, including lesser quality of public goods and more restrictions on political 
freedom. In a cross-country regressional analysis La Porta et al. (1999) shows that higher 
ethnic fractionalization is associated with more interventionism, lower government 
efficiency, i.e. more corruption, and inferior provision of public goods (the latter 
represented by proxies of demographical, educational and infrastructural variables). 
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The level of openness and democracy in a political system also influences the likelihood 
that corruption becomes widespread and persistent. In more democratic and more open 
political systems the risk of exposure of corrupt acts may be higher than in closed societies. 
Freedom of association and freedom of the press predisposes public interest groups and 
reporters to monitor public policy and expose abuses of the government. In an indirect way 
higher economic development may also contribute to the commitment and ability of the 
society to uncover abuses of political power. Economic development implies the spread of 
education, literacy, as well as depersonalized relationship thus increasing the possibility 
that an abuse of the political position will be noticed and challenged (cf. Treisman, 2000). 
 
One of the specific features of corruption is that, except for a few interested persons, it is 
invisible. Therefore the direct measurement of the intensity or spread of corruption is very 
difficult. There are several indirect ways, however, of getting information about the 
prevalence of corruption in a country or in an institution. Information can be obtained 
from: 
–  Reports on corruption available from published sources (newspapers, journals); 
–  Case studies about corrupt agencies such as tax administrations, customs offices, and 
the police; 
–  Questionnaire-based surveys: these can be related to a specific institution or to a whole 
country; these surveys measure the perception of corruption rather than corruption per se. 
 
The results obtained from surveys on corruption are now widely used by researchers and 
business people. The best-known of these surveys, the corruption index, has been 
constructed and compiled by Transparency International.1 In this article the published 
values of this index will be used. Transparency International’s annual index of ‘perceived 
corruption’ represents a poll of polls, constructed by a team of researchers at Göttingen 
University from a number of individual surveys of businessmen or local population of the 
relevant countries as well as from several ratings by economic risk analysts and country 
experts. 
 
Over the past ten years, when the nature and impact of corruption gained growing 
attention among scholars, politicians and public officials, numerous investigations have 
been made about the effects of corruption on the economy. By using the available 
quantified indices of corruption several cross-sectional econometric analyses were carried 
out, reporting important quantitative results regarding the effects of corruption on various 
macroeconomic variables. These results by and large suggest that corruption has a negative 
impact on economic growth (Mauro, 2004). The detailed results that support this outcome 
are the following: Corruption reduces investment and, as a consequence, the growth rate of 
output (Mauro, 1995); it reduces expenditure on education and health (Mauro, 1998); 
decreases public investments (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997) and also reduces the outcomes of 
public spending.2  Corruption distorts the effects of industrial policy on investments (Ades 
and Di Tella, 1997); diminishes the productivity of public investments and the productivity 
of the country’s infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi,1997); reduces tax revenues, mainly 
through its adverse impact on the work of tax and customs administrations, thereby 
limiting the government’s ability to realize the needed level of public expenditures (Tanzi 
                                                           
1 See for instance: www.transparency.org/cpi/2000/cpi2000.html 
 
2 An example for the latter result: in countries with low level of corruption public health 
spending reduces infant and child mortality rates more than in countries with higher level of 
corruption (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002). 
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and Davoodi, 1997); corruption also reduces foreign direct investment, because it operates 
as an additional tax (Wei, 1997).  
 
In the investigations of the behaviour of different visible segments of the labour market, 
i.e. employment, self-employment and unemployment the direct effect of the corruption 
has usually been neglected. The impact of corruption has been seriously taken into account 
only in the investigation of the hidden (unofficial) economy. Theoretically the relationship 
between corruption and the hidden economy may be either complementary3 or 
substitutive4. The empirical evidence so far has been mostly in favour of complementarity, 
however, a recent paper by Dreher and Schneider (2006) shows that in high income 
countries corruption and the hidden economy are substitutes, while in low income 
countries they are complements.  
 
Loayza (1997) investigates the emergence of the hidden (informal) economy assuming 
that excessive taxes and regulations on the on hand, and a government unable to enforce 
these on the other, are together important explanatory factors for hidden activities. His 
proxies for weak enforcement are the quality of bureaucracy and corruption. Using data for 
Latin American countries in the early 1990s he tests some of the implications of the model 
and estimates the size of the informal sector in these countries. He uses a MIMIC model of 
latent variable, where exogenous causes determine the latent variable, and the latent 
variable determines a set of endogenous indicator variables. The causal variables are the 
corporate income tax rate, a proxy for labour market restrictions, and a proxy for the 
strength of the enforcement system5. The results of the calculations show that the size of 
the informal sector depends positively on proxies used for the tax burden and for labour 
market restrictions, and negatively on a proxy for the quality of government institutions. 
 
Johnson et al. (1997), using a sample of the transition countries, examine how the 
interplay of politics and economic and institutional incentives influences the growth of the 
unofficial economy and, in turn, how the unofficial economy affects economic 
performance. The authors set up a simple model of tax and regulatory incentives that lead 
firms to choose between operating in the official and the unofficial sector. A higher 
unofficial economy leads to a loss of public revenues, less public goods, such as law and 
order, a decrease in the productivity of firms, as well as to a further boost to the unofficial 
economy. Firms in the unofficial sector neither pay official taxes nor share in public goods 
(such as law and order). Instead, they pay private agencies – the ‘mafia’ – for contract 
enforcement and protection from thieves. A multiple equilibrium model ensues.  
 
The empirical analysis in Johnson et al. (1997), based on data from a wide variety of 
sources, offers support to the model. As output in the unofficial sector is not recorded in the 
official GDP, the authors estimate total GDP from the national electricity consumption.6 
The results suggest substantial variation in the size of the unofficial sector across the 
transition economies, as well as significant differences, in both levels and growth rates, of 
total GDP compared to the official GDP.  
                                                           
3 See Choi and Thum (2004) and Rose-Ackermann (1997). 
4 See Friedmann et al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (1998). 
5 The proxy is the average of three subjective indicators, namely the quality of bureaucracy, 
corruption in the government, and the rule of law, all reported in the International Risk 
Guide for the period 1990-1992. 
6 In a series of studies I criticised the total electricity approach used by many authors for the 
estimation of the size of the hidden economy. In search for a more reasonable alternative, I 
developed the household electricity approach, which was subsequently used in various 
estimations (see Lackó, 2000)       
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To quantify the relative costs and benefits for businesses operating in the official 
economy, the mentioned authors use an array of indicators including measures of 
liberalization, privatization, deregulation, corruption, and tax fairness, as well as 
characteristics of the legal environment; the latter are the public goods most relevant to 
their theoretical model. Better performance in terms of these institutional and legal reform 
measures is associated with a smaller unofficial economy and higher official GDP. In turn, 
a large unofficial sector and less official output are associated with larger budgetary deficits 
and higher inflation. 
 
Friedman et al. (2000) raise the question: what drives entrepreneurs and large 
businesses underground? They bring up two competing hypotheses: (1) high taxes, (2) 
special political and social institutions that govern the economy, such as excessive 
bureaucracy and corruption, and a weak legal environment. When testing the two 
hypotheses the authors use data from 69 countries for the 1990s for variables such as tax 
rates, bureaucratic hindrances, corruption, the legal environment, and the size of the 
unofficial economy. The analysis reveals no evidence that higher direct or indirect tax rates 
are associated with a larger unofficial economy. In fact, the authors find some support to 
the relationship that higher direct tax rates are associated with a smaller underground 
sector. However, when per capita income levels are controlled for (in order to allow for the 
possibility that richer countries have a better-run administration, and operate with higher 
tax rates), this paradoxical relationship ceases to be significant. By contrast, more 
bureaucracy, greater corruption and weaker legal environment are all associated with a 
larger unofficial economy, even (in most cases) when per capita income is controlled for. 
These findings are confirmed not only for the whole sample, but also for different groups of 
countries, such as the OECD countries, the transition economies and Latin American 
states.  
 
Johnson et al. (1999) also investigate the relationship between taxes and the unofficial 
economy. After building a theoretical model, they empirically show that the tax burden on 
the agents depends much more on the extent of bribery and corruption than on the tax 
rates per se.  
 
While the previously mentioned empirical analyses investigated the impact of two factors, 
tax rates and corruption on the hidden economy separately from each other, in this article 
we concentrate on the impact of the interaction between tax rates and corruption on the 
hidden economy as well as on the visible segments of the labour market. To enable this 
analysis we introduce a new indicator that we call the subjective tax rate. 
 
 
3  A new indicator: the subjective tax rate 
 
The two forms of corruption (small and grand) can be considered as extra taxes. A higher 
level of small corruption means that the nominal, statutory tax rate will be complemented 
with an additional cost or tax related to corruption. In the case of grand corruption this 
connection is more indirect: a high level of grand corruption signals that in the given 
country public revenues are less likely to be used for the necessary public services, and also 
that the risk of conducting orderly business is higher. Under extensive grand corruption the 
main functions of the public sector are distorted: the allocative function (allocation 
between social and private goods), the redistributive function (redistribution between the 
rich and poor), as well as the stabilization function (the use of the budget policy to maintain 
a sufficient level of employment, the stability of prices, budget deficit, and so on).  
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Thinking in a cost-benefit framework, the decision-maker (employee, employer, tax 
payer, etc.) observes the combined cost of conducting business, i.e. his actual tax 
obligations and his costs related to corruption. The future benefits to be materialized from 
the public utilization of recent or current tax revenues are only partly observed, because 
some benefits are realized only in the long term. However, the decision-maker observes 
that in a corrupt institutional system the benefits are reduced, they are gradually eroded; 
anyway he is facing an inefficient use of tax revenue that implies extra costs, for example in 
healthcare, in legal protection, in protection against crime, etc. Both types of corruption 
force the agents of the economy to spend extra-expenditures that can be considered extra-
taxes, which, however, do not show up as extra revenues for the state budget. 
  
Members of the society are not blind: sooner or later they perceive the extra-tax nature of 
corruption and respond in their own way. In the literature about tax compliance we find 
propositions, based both on theory and on results from controlled experiments, about 
people’s reaction to corruption. 
 
Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) and Smith (1992) hypothesize that a taxpayer will feel 
‘cheated’ if he believes that his tax dollars are not well spent, and may respond by refusing 
to pay his full tax liability. Alm et al. (1992) perform experiments to test this idea. They find 
a greater willingness to comply with tax obligations when participants perceive that they 
will receive benefits in public goods funded by the taxes collected. Using experimental 
methods Webley et al. (1991) also examine what role the taxpayers’ satisfaction with the 
operation of the government plays in the compliance to pay taxes. The authors find that 
those participants, whose responses to a survey taken several months before the 
experiments had indicated alienation from government or a negative attitude towards laws, 
were significantly more likely to engage in tax evasion during the experiments. In their 
theoretical model Pommerehne et al. (1994) found that the greater the deviation between 
the individuals’ optimal choice of public goods provision and the actual level, the more 
they, as taxpayers, underpay their taxes; the higher the level of squander by the 
government in the previous period, the less the individual is willing to contribute in the 
present. In their survey investigation for the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and 
Poland, Hanousek and Palda (2002) found that those, who believed they are getting quality 
government services also tended to evade taxes much less than those, who did not believe 
getting the services they expected. The authors show that governments are constrained in 
their actual tax collection by the perceptions people have about the quality of government 
services that they receive.  
 
Based on the considerations summarized above we can state: a simple comparison of 
statutory tax rates across countries to analyze the tax burden may be misleading, since in 
this case we do not take into account the environment in which tax rates let their impact be 
felt. In this context environment means the way taxes are set and collected (coherence, 
transparency and the orderliness of the tax system and tax collection) as well as the way 
taxes are used in the provision of government services (again transparent, orderly and 
economical utilization). For a proper cross-country comparison of the tax burden we define 
a new indicator, the so-called subjective tax rate, which combines the traditional tax rate 
with the level of inefficiency of the institutional environment.7 In this article the latter is to 
be proxied by the level of corruption in the given country.  
 
                                                           
7   A similar concept was introduced in Johnson et al. (1999), where the authors developed a 
theoretical model of the informal economy in which tax rate and corruption were combined in 
one variable, the so-called “generalized tax rate on output”. As they wrote: “The generalized tax 
rate t includes taxation, regulation and corruption.“ (p. 4.) 
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Let us assume that corruption is considered by people as a burden, and this burden is 
translated into tax-equivalent units. The tax-equivalent burden of corruption shows the 
effect of corruption as if it implied an additional tax.8 Translating the level of corruption to 
tax-equivalents has to take into account that, by convention, the perception of the level of 
corruption is measured/estimated on a scale between 1 and k*, where 1 indicates the most 
corrupt, and k* the corruption-free environment.  
 
 The size of corruption in tax-equivalent units can be expressed as follows:  
 t k = a1(k*-k)                                                                                                      (1) 
  
or, choosing another formulation 
 
 ln  tk = a2 (ln k*- ln k)                                                                                      (2) 
 
where tk : the cost of corruption expressed in tax-equivalent units, per cent of the tax base 
  k : corruption index; a higher value means lower corruption (1, …. k*) 
  k*: maximal value of the corruption index, meaning a corruption-free 
environment 
 
The subjective tax rate is the sum of the traditional tax rate and the tax-equivalent of 
corruption: 




 ln  ts = ln t + ln tk = ln t + a2 (ln k*- ln k)                                                   (4) 
 
where ts : subjective tax rate  
  t : traditional statutory tax rate 
 
It is understandable why we call this rate the subjective tax rate: it reflects that the 
objective values of traditional tax rates are perceived or interpreted by economic agents in 
the light of their own subjective experience of the quality of public administration which 
sets, collects and spends these taxes. While the subjective tax rate is primarily sensed at the 
micro level, this perception is communicated at large, and therefore its impact can be felt 
and interpreted at the macro level as well. In the present article we deal with the subjective 
tax rates at the macro level and use this indicator to make international comparisons. 
The actual weight of the subjective tax rate compared to the traditional tax rate (a1 or a2) 
has to be identified empirically. The tax-equivalent unit of corruption can be assessed 
within a regressional framework, where particular variables are explained, among other 
factors, by the effects of the traditional tax rate and corruption. After identifying a1 or a2 we 
can make statements that one unit change in corruption intensity, in its effect on the 
explained variable, is equal to changes of a certain number of units in the statutory tax rate. 
 
According to our preliminary regressional analyses about corporate taxes and taxes on 
labour, the form of the subjective tax rate is close to that in (4), and the value of a2 is close 
to 1. Namely: 
                                                           
8   The idea of the tax equivalent of corruption was already used in Wei (1997) and Barth et al. 
(2001), where the authors investigated FDI in a cross-country perspective, and transformed the 
opacity index into a tax equivalent. Taxes and corruption were used in interaction empirically 
in Lackó (2003, 2004) and Torrini (2005).  
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 ln  ts = ln t + ln tk = ln t +  ln k*- ln k                                                          (5) 
 
In the next sections of this article we will test whether the subjective tax rate, constructed 
according to the above described formula, is really meaningful and operates in a sensible 
way in the labour market. 
 
The scale of the subjective tax rate depends on the scales of its constituting factors. It 
reaches its maximum level in the case when the agent operates in the maximally corrupt 
environment and he is also obliged to pay the largest physically possible tax from his 
revenue. Naturally, such an extreme case does not occur in reality. 
 
Table 1 presents cross-country data for the traditional tax wedge9 and the corresponding 
values of the subjective tax wedge for 28 OECD countries in 2000. We can see that Sweden 
has the highest traditional tax wedge, but with respect to the subjective tax wedge, it is 
close to the average value of the OECD countries. Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark 
also have traditional tax wedges higher than the average, but the values of their subjective 
tax wedge are below the OECD average. Mexico is an opposite example: its traditional tax 
wedge is below-average, but according to its subjective tax wedge, Mexicans are exposed to 
a much higher tax burden, than the average of the OECD countries. The three Central and 
East European transition economies in the sample (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic) have both higher than average traditional tax wedge, and higher than average 
subjective tax wedge in this group of countries. This is the case with some more developed 
market economies as well, such as Italy, Belgium, Greece and Spain.  
                                           
[Table 1] 
                                                                       
 
4 The impact of the subjective tax rate on different segments of the 
labour market 
 
4.1 Hidden  economy 
Several recent studies summarized in section 3 arrived at the counterintuitive conclusion 
that there was no connection between the size of the hidden economy and the tax rates. 
Based on their results we should believe that a high level of corruption and weak 
performance of the legal and institutional environment are sufficient to induce people to 
work in the hidden economy, and traditional tax rates have no impact on the size of hidden 
activities. In this section we challenge this view and show – with the help of different 
indicators of taxes and two different samples of countries – that the subjective tax rate does 
exert a strong influence on the size of the hidden economy. We use two country samples, 
and for both we use data for the size of the hidden economy from already available 
estimations, i.e. from sources independent from this work.  
 
Sample I covers 31  countries, including 18 developed, 8 developing and 5 transition 
countries. Our results indicate, similarly to those of Friedman et al (2000), that neither the 
income tax rate nor the corporate tax rate has significant relationship with the size of the 
                                                           
9  The tax wedge here is calculated as the sum of employees’ and employers’ social security 
contributions, plus personal income tax, less transfer payments, all as a percentage of gross 
labour costs, paid by one-earner married couple at the so-called APW (average production 
wage) level. 
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hidden economy (see column [1] in Table 2). If we add the corruption index (column [2]), 
we get better results: according to these, the size of the hidden economy is significantly 
influenced by the extent of corruption and the income tax rate. In column [3] the results of 
the regression calculation are presented in which instead of the traditional tax rates 
(income and corporate taxes) we used the subjective tax rates. In this calculation the effects 
of the tax rates on the size of the hidden economy are significant: with higher subjective tax 




Sample II contains 21 OECD countries, and here we make calculations with another type 
of tax indicator, the tax wedge. The results of the calculations are shown in the second 
block of Table 2. As it turns out, in this sample the tax wedge and the corruption index 
explain the size of the hidden economy, both separately and jointly. In column [5] we can 
observe that the absolute size of the coefficient of the traditional tax wedge approximately 
equals that of the coefficient of the corruption index.10 From this coincidence one may 
derive that the subjective tax rate is the single relevant explanatory variable here. For this 
reason, when proceeding with the estimations, it comes as no surprise that the subjective 
tax wedge shows a significant explanatory impact on the hidden economy in this sample 
(see column [6] in Table 2). 
 
The calculations on the two samples of countries above give a preliminary indication that 
the subjective tax rate is a relevant concept. However, the results have to be taken with 
caution in view of certain problems in the previous estimations: 
(1)  In the calculations outlined above the values for the size of the hidden economy 
(the left hand side variable) were taken from sources which, given the nature of the hidden 
economy, produced these values based on certain estimation procedures. These 
procedures, in turn, usually already assume the impact of different tax rates on the hidden 
economy. For this reason, when we use the estimated values of the size of the hidden 
economy with the aim of investigating the impact of tax rates, we can easily arrive at a 
tautological relationship.  
(2)  The above-mentioned similarity of the coefficients – the elasticity of the size of the 
hidden economy on tax rates on the hand, and of the corruption index on the other – may 
be accidental, determined by the actual sample we use. 
(3)  The causality of the relationship between the size of the hidden economy and the 
extent of corruption needs a thorough analysis. 
For the above reasons, we carry out further investigations to show to what extent the 
subjective tax rate is a relevant concept. We focus on the determination of participation in 
different segments of the labour market, in areas that are not as uncertain and invisible as 
the hidden economy. More precisely, we analyse whether the subjective tax rates can 
contribute to explaining the cross-country differences in the rates of employment, self-
employment and unemployment.  
 
4.2  Visible labour market segments 
Various theories as well as empirical investigations of the labour market deal with the 
impact of tax rates and labour market institutions on the different segments of this market 
(see Blanchard, 2005; Nickell et al., 2005; Nickell, 2003; Planas et al., 2003; Jackmann, 
                                                           
10 I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  S a m p l e  I  w e  e x p e r i e n c e  a  similar correspondence between the sum of the 
coefficients of the two tax rates on the one hand, and the coefficient of the corruption index, on 
the other, in column [2] of Table 2. 
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2002; Belot and Van Ours, 2001; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Elmeskov et al., 1998; 
Leibfritz et al., 1997; Nickell, 1997; Daveri and Tabellini, 1997; Scarpetta, 1996; Layard et 
al., 1991).11 
 
It is well known that taxes on labour influence both workers’ decisions about how much 
labour they supply, and firms’ decisions about how much labour they employ. Higher 
personal income taxes and employee social security contributions tend to reduce the return 
to working, which may discourage labour supply and depress potential output. Not only 
employment, but also wages may respond to the variation in labour taxes. The size and 
pattern of this response, however, depend on the institutional structure of wage bargaining, 
labour market policies and the degree of competition in the product markets. In the 
presence of rigidities on both labour and product markets, workers’ resistance to higher 
taxes imposed on their labour efforts can boost wage demands, thereby raising the labour 
costs for employers. On the employer’s side, in the presence of rigidities, an increase in 
statutory payroll taxes (social security contributions by the employer) will raise labour costs 
directly, i.e. employers will not be able to offset the additional taxes by lowering wages. 
Such shifting of taxes onto labour costs, in turn, decreases the demand for labour, as it 
decreases profitability and investment.  
 
It is also well known that various groups of the unemployed react differently to the wage 
rates in their employment decisions, because of the different elasticity of their labour 
supply. Females and young people have a more elastic labour supply, because they tend to 
be the marginally employed. As the literature suggests, they react also more strongly to tax 
rates than do older males. In addition, in a theoretical framework Bertola et al. (2002) 
showed that the functioning of labour market institutions, which are meant to improve 
workers’ income share, leads to larger disemployment effects when labour supply is more 
elastic. 
 
Employee and employer behaviour observing the subjective tax rate, rather than the usual 
taxes, may modify these traditional effects of labour taxes. Higher subjective taxes due to 
an increasingly corrupt environment may further discourage the supply of labour. This 
environment may, however, also discourage employers and contribute to a lower demand 
for labour: facing higher costs or uncertainty due to high corruption decisions on 
investment into new fixed assets may be cut back. 
 
In order to identify these effects on the labour market in the following we carry out cross-
country investigations on unemployment rates and employment rates (differentiated by 
gender) and self-employment rates (with and without unpaid family workers). The 
calculations are made on data for the OECD countries for the period 1995-2000. The 
factors tested are the usual explanatory variables in the literature, complemented by the 
level of the corruption indicator in the investigated countries as a component of the 
subjective tax rate. The regression equations are estimated by the Two-stage Least Squares 
method, with Huber-White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroscedasticity.  
 
Since in the tested models the variable of corruption may be endogenous, it had to be 
instrumented. The selected instruments are cultural and institutional variables: as 
                                                           
11 While these studies provide a more-or-less general consensus view about the macro-
behavioural patterns present in labour markets in industrialized countries, recently a 
radically critical opinion was presented about this consensus model. In their recent paper 
Baker et al. (2004), after surveying the above mentioned studies, show that their own new 
empirical results are, at many instances, in sharp contrast with the generally accepted model 
of the factors influencing the labour markets.  
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discussed in section 2 of this study, the literature on corruption suggests that certain 
cultural and historical factors are traditionally closely related to the extent of corruption in 
the given country. The instrumental variables used are the following: the average value of 
five different indices characterizing the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization of the 
population; the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code (English Common 
Law or continental-type law); the percentage of the population belonging to the Protestant 






In the explanation of cross-country differences in unemployment rates, labour taxes are, 
as a rule, important factors, along with the following ones: the generosity of the 
unemployment benefit system, the character of the wage bargaining system, the level of 
unionization, the strength of employment protection legislation, the importance of labour 
standards, and active labour market policies.  
 
A generous unemployment benefit system increases the level of unemployment through 
two mechanisms: (1) it reduces the disutility of unemployment and directly increases 
pressure on the wages paid by the employees; (2) it decreases the ‘effectiveness’ of 
unemployed people as potential fillers of vacancies, by allowing them to be choosier (c.f. 
Nickell, 1997). 
 
The wage bargaining system has two main sides, employees and employers. Depending 
on the strength and the coordination of these two sides the system has different effects on 
the labour market. The extent of unionization, reflected in the indicator of union coverage, 
may play an important role. High union coverage tends to contribute to raising the pay, 
and by this it contributes to a rise in the unemployment rate. This effect, however, may not 
occur if the unions and employers coordinate the bargaining activities. While some studies 
consider both employment protection legislation and labour standards important in 
influencing unemployment rates, others refute this claim. The crucial tax variable usually 
considered in this context  is the tax wedge.  
 
In the following calculations tax wedge is defined as the ratio of income tax plus social 
security contributions (paid by both employers and employees) to the labour cost.12 Beside 
the traditional tax wedge and the level of corruption we consider the following explanatory 
variables: the variable characterizing the unemployment benefit system (with the help of 
the replacement rate), the variable of labour market rigidities13, the qualitative index 
characterizing the degree of employers’ and unions’ coordination in the wage bargaining 
systems, union density, the index of union coverage, the inflation rate, and time dummies 
for each year.  
 
In columns [1] and [2] of Table 3/A we present the results of our regression calculations 
that aim at explaining the total unemployment rate in the OECD countries in 1995-2000. 
Regression calculations for [1] and [2] (and the following pairs of regressions) differ in 
terms of the tax variables used: equation [1] uses the traditional tax wedge, while [2] the 
subjective tax wedge. In the first regression the parameters of the following variables are 
                                                           
12   This corresponds to the use of the concept of tax wedge in OECD analyses and statistics. 
13 This proxy is based on the number of ILO convention regulations aimed at protecting 
employees that have been ratified by the relevant national parliament. 
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significant and have the proper signs: the tax wedge, the proxy of labour rigidities 
(ILOCONV), the intensity of employers’ and employees’ coordination in wage bargaining 
(COORDINATION), the inflation rate, and the time dummies. The variables of 
replacement rate (BENEFIT) and union coverage (UNCOV) turn out not to be significant. 




The regression results in [2] confirm that the subjective tax wedge is significant; in 
addition, the coefficient of the replacement rate becomes significant with the expected sign, 
and the value of R2 is higher than in regression [1].  
 
Columns [3] and [4] of Table 3/A present results for similar regression calculations, but 
for the female unemployment rate. The role of the subjective tax rate is confirmed here as 
in the previous calculation: there is a significant effect of the subjective tax wedge on the 
variation of the female unemployment rate. In regression [3] the replacement rate has a 
strong positive effect, which means that a high replacement ratio particularly ‘encourages’ 
female workers to move into unemployment. When we use the subjective tax wedge, the 
union density (DENSITY) turns out significant. When we do not consider the corruption 
index (built in the variable of subjective tax rate), R2 takes the value 0.73, while in the 
equation with the subjective tax wedge R2 becomes 0.78.  
 
We continue the investigation with the equations for male unemployment (columns [5] 
and [6]). This makes it possible to analyze whether there is any difference in the 
determination of the male unemployment rate from that of the female unemployment rate. 
In column [5] the parameters of the traditional tax wedge, the proxy for labour market 
rigidities, the index of employers’ and employees’ coordination, and union density are all 
significant and have the proper signs. It is an important result that here, contrary to the 
case of female unemployment rate, the replacement ratio has no effect on the 
unemployment rate. If we consider the subjective tax wedge as one of the explanatory 
variables (see column [6]), this again turns out significant with a positive sign (although 
with a smaller parameter than in equations [2] and [4]). The fact that male unemployed are 
less sensitive to the traditional tax rate than females is well known in the literature; it is a 
surprising new result, however, that male unemployed are similarly less sensitive to the 
subjective tax rate, than their female counterparts. (This implies that male employed 
respond similarly or less sensitively to changes in corruption than the female unemployed.)  
Regressions explaining the long term unemployment rate are presented in Table 3/B. 
In columns [1] and [2] the regressions do not contain the union-coverage variable, 
while in columns [3] and [4] they do. In both pairs of regressions we can see that the 
effects of the traditional tax wedge and of subjective tax wedge are similar; the fitting 
values of the estimations are, however, higher when the subjective form of the tax 
wedge is used. When we insert into regressions the variable of union coverage, the 
effects of both the traditional and subjective tax wedges become much smaller. The 
reason is that some multicollinearity appears between the traditional tax wedge and the 
variable of union coverage. It is important to note that almost all explanatory variables 
have much higher coefficients in the equation explaining the long term unemployment 
rate than in the equation related to total unemployment rate, reflecting a stronger 
reaction of the unemployed to their environment when they are out of work longer (see 






In the following regressional calculations the determinants of the cross-country 
variation in the employment rate are investigated, i.e. of the ratio of employed to the 
working-age population. We use the same explanatory variables as in the analysis of 
unemployment rates, but, in addition to the tax wedge on labour, we also focus on the 
corporate tax rate as well to its equivalent in the subjective tax rate.  
 
In Table 4/A the first equation (column [1]) makes regressional estimations with the help 
of the two traditional tax rates. As it turns out, the coefficients of both the tax wedge and 
the traditional corporate tax rate show significant negative effects. The coefficient of the 
replacement ratio is positive and significant. This would mean that with a higher 
replacement ratio for the unemployed there is a stronger tendency to participate in the 
labour market as employed. This relationship strongly contradicts the expectation that 
more generous benefits attract people to the unemployment status, rather than to the 
employment status! We will return to this paradoxical result below when we analyse the 
impact of unemployment benefits on male and female employment rates. In regression [1] 
the parameters of the variables of wage bargaining coordination, union coverage and 
labour market rigidities are significant and with the expected signs.   
[Table 4/A] 
 
In columns [2], [3] and [4] the results of the regression calculations indicate that growth 
in the subjective tax rate influences negatively the total employment rate: higher subjective 
tax rates go together with lower employment rates. The effect of the subjective tax wedge 
on labour is stronger than that of the subjective corporate tax rate. The parameters of the 
coordination of wage bargaining, union coverage and labour rigidities are significant and 
with the expected signs.  
 
We have seen above that the unemployment rates of the two genders react rather 
differently to changes in the various explanatory variables. It is therefore justified to 
carry out the investigation for the employment rate separately for the two genders, the 
same way as it was done for the unemployed. Figures 1 and 2 show the relationship 
between the subjective tax wedge and the subjective corporate tax rate on the one hand, 
and the male and female employment rates, on the other. Even in these reduced 
relationships we can see that male and female employment rates react differently to 
changes in the subjective tax rates (see the difference between the steepness of the 





Table 4/B and 4/C show the results of these regression calculations. Here we find that in 
the determination of the female employment rate the traditional tax wedge has no effect, 
while the traditional corporate tax rate has a significant negative effect (see column [1] in 
Table 4/B). The former experience is connected with the multicollinearity between the tax 
wedge and the variable of union coverage. The level of union coverage seems to be a very 
important factor in the determination of female employment: higher coverage goes 
together with a lower female employment rate. The effect of union density, however, is 






In the explanation of the male employment rate the effect of the traditional tax wedge is 
very strong, while the traditional corporate tax rate has no effect at all. We find that here 
the density of the unions has a much stronger n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  t h a n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  
equation of the female employment. Interestingly, the generosity of unemployment 
benefits has no explanatory power for either the male or the female employment rates. 
While the generosity of unemployment benefits affects the rate of unemployment, 
especially female unemployment, it seems to have little impact on male and female 
employment, and shows a counter-intuitive – weakly positive – effect on total employment 
(see above). What is clear that high unemployment benefits lead to high unemployment 
rates, but it is also true that generous benefits must make participation in the labour 
market in general more attractive: after all, participation is a necessary condition to be 
eligible for those unemployment benefits. Accordingly, a weak impact of benefits on the 
employment rate may occur, because a strong unemployment effect and a strong labour 
market participation effect tend to cancel out each other (cf. Nickell, 1997, p. 68).  
 
When we go further to the equations containing the subjective tax rates in Tables 4/B 
and 4/C we find that the subjective tax wedge has negative effect on both the female 
and male employment rates; however, the subjective corporate tax rate has a much 
smaller effect on the male than on the female employment rate. The qualitatively 
smaller effect of the subjective corporate t a x  r a t e  o n  m a l e  e m p l oyment is not only 
interesting, but also surprising. All these unexpected differences between the 
employment (and unemployment) behaviour of males and females need some 
explanation. We shall attempt to provide a sufficient rationalization for this puzzling 
behaviour below in the course of investigating a special part of the employed people, 




The sector of self-employed is, as a rule, a poorly recorded and somewhat mysterious part 
of the national economies. As a consequence, the determination of the size of self-
employment is far from straightforward. In most countries the agricultural sector uses a 
relatively high proportion of self-employed workers, therefore, in a cross-country 
perspective a higher share of agricultural employment is usually associated with a higher 
share of self-employment in total employment. During the 1990s, however, in most OECD 
countries non-agricultural self-employment grew faster than civilian employment as a 
whole, with the effect of increasing the share of non-agricultural self-employed. Various, to 
some extent overlapping, explanations have been put forward for this recent renaissance in 
self-employment (c. f. OECD, 2000a):  
(1)  It may have been a reaction to the overly rigid labour and product markets and 
to the high level of taxation. The opportunities that self-employment offers in paying less 
tax to the state could have been partly responsible for the recent reallocation of 
employment to this sector.  
(2)  The growth of the self-employed sector reflected changes in the industrial 
organization. Greater stress on outsourcing non-core activities may have increased the 
amount of work subcontracted to the self-employed, due to the experience that self-




Cross-country studies traditionally emphasize that there is a strong negative correlation 
between the level of GDP per capita and the share of non-agricultural self-employment 
without unpaid family workers (Kuznets, 1966, Schultz, 1990, Bregger, 1996). This 
empirical finding is usually substantiated with the argument that a low level of prosperity 
coincides with a low level of wages, implying little pressure to increase efficiency, or to 
increase the average scale of enterprise activities. At this stage of development a major 
route for ambitious wage earners to increase their incomes is to set up an own shop and 
become an entrepreneur. Economic development subsequently leads to rising wages, 
which stimulates enterprises to work more efficiently and to reap economies of scale and 
scope. An additional effect of rising wage levels is the increased attraction of wage-
employment: the high and secure income of wage-earners increase the opportunity cost of 
becoming self-employed (cf. Iygun and Owen, 1998).  
 
Empirical investigations, including cross-sectional econometric investigations usually try 
to find out which of these two tendencies – traditional, income-related or/and the more 
recent, organization- and regulations-related trends – are dominant in the determination 
of the size of the self-employed sector. The usual explanatory factors to be used are the level 
of development, the unemployment rate, the proportion of women in the labour force, the 
share of GDP produced in the service sector, as well as average and marginal tax rates (see 
Acs et al., 1994, Staber and Bogenhold, 1993, Robson and Wren, 1999). 
 
In these models the sign of the coefficient of the unemployment rate is a priori uncertain, 
since the unemployment rate may either decrease or increase together with the self-
employment rate depending on the segments of the labour market from which people 
move to the self-employment sector. Estimates concerning the effect of unemployment on 
self-employment vary from study to study. Investigations at the micro-level, however, show 
that most self-employed people were previously in wage and salary employment, and a 
substantial proportion of self-employed leave their self employed status for entering or re-
entering the segment of wage- and salary-employment. Only a very small proportion of the 
unemployed people find employment through self-employment. 
 
 As for the other variables in the regressional equations explaining self-employment, the 
proportion of women in the labour force is usually expected to have a negative sign, while  
the share of the service sector in GDP a positive sign. While these are plausible 
assumptions, not all relevant econometric estimations could confirm them.  
 
With respect to the role of the average tax rate, most of the investigations arrived at 
the result that the tax rate has a positive coefficient: the environment characterized by 
higher average tax rates provides more incentive to find ways of avoiding and evading 
taxes through self-employment, and people tend to utilize these opportunities. This was 
found, for instance, by Robson and Wren (1999), OECD (2000a) and Scharle (2002), 
but one can find a few such investigations as well which could not confirm this 
assumption. A recent article by Torrini (2005) uses the statutory tax wedge in the 
explanation of cross-country differences in the self-employment rate in the non-
agricultural sectors of the OECD countries. He shows that unless self-employment 
offers sufficiently high tax evasion opportunities, a higher tax rate reduces the incentive 
to enter self-employment. If the tax evasion opportunities for the self-employed 
workers are sufficiently high, a tax increase will encourage growth in self-
employment.14 He also takes into account the size of public employment that has a 
                                                           
14 Torrini (2005) uses a variable that contains the interaction of the tax wedge and a dummy 
denoting countries that have a higher than average corruption perception index. A special 
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negative significant impact on self-employment rates showing a crowding-out effect on 
self-employment opportunities.   
  
The econometric analysis of the self-employment rate in OECD (2000a) incorporates also 
the average unemployment benefit replacement rate as an explanatory variable. The 
replacement rate is expected to have a negative sign based on the idea that an increase in 
this rate tends to increase the attractiveness of wage-employment through the advantages 
of unemployment insurance: if business opportunities turn to worse, self-employed have 
no opportunity to get unemployment benefits, while wage earners, if they lose their jobs, 
may pull back to this shelter.  
 
After this introduction we turn to our own investigation of the determinants of the self-
employment rate in the OECD countries in 1995-2000 using, among others, the new 
indicator, the subjective tax rate. In Table 5 we present the results for the total self-
employment rate with and without the unpaid family workers.  The explanatory variables 
are the traditional and subjective tax wedge, the traditional and subjective corporate tax 
rate, the index of the unemployment benefit system, and the share of agricultural 
employment. 
 
As the results indicate, in all the regression calculations the agricultural employment rate 
has a very strong positive effect. As indicated above, this comes as no surprise. In the 
calculation where the impact of corruption as an extra tax is not taken into account 
(columns [1] and [3] of Table 5) we find that the tax wedge has a positive and significant 
parameter, which means that higher traditional tax rates on labour induce, ceteris paribus, 
higher rates of self-employment. The reasons are twofold. First, for the self-employed 
himself/herself, the self-employment status offers ample opportunity to evade taxes and 
higher taxes offer more encouragement to choose a status where one can evade them. 
Second, higher taxes offer more opportunities for tax-avoidance for the enterprises that 
traditionally employ workers. By pushing some of their employees to the self-employed 
sector, and keeping them working for the enterprise, through this outsourcing setup they 




In the regression calculations the variable representing the unemployment benefit 
entitlement has a negative sign. This result is in accordance with our expectation: more 
generous benefits make more people give up their self-employed position for the wage-
earner status.  In the regression calculations incorporating the subjective tax rates 
(columns [2] and [4] in Table 5) the coefficients for these taxes turn out significant. The 
fitting values are fairly high, in fact higher than in the regression with the traditional tax 
rates.  
 
Now we return to the puzzles experienced above, i.e. in the course of explaining the rates 
of unemployment and employment for various genders. We discovered that the male 
unemployment rate was much less sensitive to the size of the subjective tax wedge, than the 
unemployment rate of the females. In addition, when analyzing the employment, it 
appeared that the labour supply of men, unlike that of the women, was not sensitive to the 
subjective corporate tax rate.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
interaction of the tax rates and the corruption index, the subjective tax rate was used already 
in Lackó (2003, 2004) for the explanation of cross-country differences in the size of the 
hidden economy, unemployment, long-term unemployment, employment rates and the self-
employment rate.  
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We believe that the puzzle can be solved in a satisfactory manner if we properly take into 
account the results received for the self-employment rates. To help the interpretation we 
have to acknowledge the fact that our results for the self-employed are relevant mostly for 
the men: statistical data as well as several studies show that in the OECD countries the 
probability of being self-employed is much higher among men than women (see 
Blanchflower, 2000; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998).  
 
In human societies the basic unit of living and subsistence is the family, and in the 
traditional family model male employment is critical for earning for the whole of the 
family. This condition already defines the difference between the employment behaviours 
of the two genders. The results of our investigations indicate that, if higher traditional tax 
rates are combined with a higher level of corruption, this implies worse conditions for 
employment. If, in this way, the employee status is less available and/or less attractive, 
female workers who used to be employees choose or accept to become either unemployed, 
o r  u n p a i d  f a m i l y  w o r k e r s ,  o r  t o  c o m p l e t e ly leave the labour market. Under similar 
conditions, male employees make a different choice: in order to maintain a certain flow of 
(declared) earnings for their family, they become, as a rule, self-employed.  
 
In the sections above we found an additional gender-specific difference in the 
employment behaviour, and it was related to the impact of the generosity of the 
unemployment benefit. While in the case of female employees the size of the 
unemployment benefit, ceteris paribus, positively influences both the unemployment rate 
and the employment rate, in the case of the male employees there is no direct effect of the 
benefits on either the unemployment rate or the employment rate. While this may seem 
puzzling, if we take into account the special behaviour of the self-employed, we discover an 
indirect impact of the unemployment benefits on male employment: since the increasing 
generosity of the unemployment benefits decreases the share of self-employed, this implies 
an increasing share of the employees within the employed males. This way this behavioural 
pattern ensures for the male employees that they would increasingly be eligibility for the 
unemployment benefits in the future.   
     
 
5 Summary  and  conclusions 
 
This study aimed at explaining how tax rates, the level of corruption and various 
institutional aspects of the labour market influence the relative size of different segments of 
the labour market in developed market economies. Dissatisfaction with the weak, 
ambiguous, or misleading impact of such crucial factors as statutory tax rates and the 
indicator of corruption in the literature stimulated the author to look for alternative 
explanatory variables. As a result, a new, synthetic variable was devised, tested and used: 
the subjective tax rate. This concept combines the traditional tax rate with the level of 
inefficiency of the institutional environment, the latter being proxied by the level of 
corruption in the given country.  
 
The subsequent empirical investigations showed that the explanation of worker 
participation in both the visible segments of the labour market and in its invisible part 
requires the use of this new concept: along with other institutional differences in the labour 
market, subjective tax rates are relevant factors explaining the cross-country differences in 
unemployment, employment and self-employment rates, as well as the size of the hidden 
economy. With the use of the new variable the experience that similarly high statutory tax 
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rates lead to different labour market outcomes in different countries remains no more a 
puzzle.  
 
The environment characterized by the subjective tax rate does not affect male and female 
participants of the labour market the same way. Potential male and female employees, due 
to their different status in the family, show distinct features in their response to changing 
conditions.  If higher subjective tax rates make the conditions of employment worse, the 
response of female and male employees will be different. Female workers either go into 
unemployment, or join the group of unpaid family workers within the self-employed sector, 
or even leave the labour market. In contrast, male participants, since they are expected to 
earn a living for the rest of the family, make, as a rule, every effort to become self-employed 
and preserve, even if partly, a status in the visible economy.  
 
The various behavioural patterns discussed in the study shed light on certain similar and 
diverging functions of the three “shelters” available for the potential employees when they 
face high statutory taxes, corrupt environment, or both. These shelters are: unemployment, 
self-employment and the hidden economy. Members of the potential labour force move 
across these segments – sometimes in an erratic way, but in certain situations showing 
some rational patterns. For instance, a withdrawal to the self-employment sector may 
contribute also to the increase of the hidden economy, since self-employed persons are able 
to evade and avoid taxes more easily than regular employees. Since this is also true for 
those who become unemployed, here we see some parallel mechanisms. A high corporate 
tax rate combined with a high level of corruption may force employees to give up their 
status and become self-employed subcontractors of their old firm. These are the so-called 
false self-employed: in practical terms they are still employees, but are undeclared as far as 
payroll taxes are concerned. This transformation of the employee status enables both 
employees and employers to evade taxes, but the same changes in conditions may also 
increase the share of non-employed people who (just like the self-employed) are prone to 
be engaged in the hidden economy.  
 
Another factor, the generosity of unemployment benefits, in turn shows differing 
functions of two of the shelter sectors. While increasingly generous unemployment benefits 
may contribute to an increase in the number of unemployed, they induce, ceteris paribus, a 




Traditional and subjective tax wedge, 2000
Country Tax wedge
a Corruption index 
b Subjective tax wedge
per cent per cent
Australia 7.7 8.3 9.3
Luxembourg 10.9 8.6 12.7
New Zealand 15.2 9.4 16.2
Switzerland 18.1 8.6 21.0
Ireland 15.5 7.2 21.5
Canada 21.2 9.2 23.0
United Kingdom 22.6 8.7 26.0
USA 21.6 7.8 27.7
Norway 27.3 9.1 30.0
Japan 20.1 6.4 31.4
Denmark 31.2 9.8 31.8
Austria 29.6 7.7 38.4
Korea 15.8 4.0 39.5
Netherlands 35.4 8.9 39.8
Finland 39.8 10.0 39.8
Portugal 26.2 6.4 40.9
Germany 33.1 7.6 43.6
Spain 30.6 7.0 43.7
Mexico 15.0 3.3 45.5
Sweden 42.8 9.4 45.5
Czech Republic 24.8 4.3 57.7
France 39.0 6.7 58.2
Belgium 40.4 6.1 66.2
Hungary 37.0 5.2 71.2
Greece 35.8 4.9 73.1
Italy 36.3 4.6 78.9
Poland 38.1 4.1 92.9
Turkey 40.2 3.8 105.8
Average 27.5 7.0 44.0
Sources:  a. Taxing Wages, OECD, 2002




Regressions for the hidden economy 
Dependent variable: Hidden economy in per cent of GDP 
Sample I Sample II 
Explanatory v.  [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6] 
Tax rate  traditional  traditional subjective traditional traditional  subjective
ln GDP  -17  -12 -13 -11 -6.7  -6.6
[-11.01]  [-4.53] [-7.59] [-5.83] [-2.07]  [-2.43]
ln INCOMETAX  2.9  3.9
[1.51]  [2.20]
ln TAXWEDGE  8.1 7 
[3.17] [2.75] 
ln CORPTAX  6  3.8
[1.19] [1.78] 
ln CORRUPTION i. -9.3 -7 
[-2.39] [-1.92] 
ln SINCOMETAX  4
[2.30]
ln STAXWEDGE  6.9 
[3.88]
4.5 ln SCORPTAX 
[2.16]
R2  0.84  0.86 0.86 0.64 0.69  0.71
RMSE  5.4  5 4.9 3.7 3.5  3.4 
n  31  31 31 21 21  21 
Method  OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS
Sample I source: Friedman et al.(2000), 31 countries











Regressions for the unemployment rates
Equations
[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6]  Dependent variables 
total un.  total un. female un. female un. male un.  male un.
Tax rate  traditional subjective traditional subjective traditional  subjective
Explanatory var. 
ln TAXWEDGE  0.96  1.14 0.8 
[8.01]  [8.59] [6.78] 
ln STAXWEDGE  0.71 0.89 0.55
[7.99] [9.15] [6.14]
0.019  0.21 0.077 0.32 -0.096  0.0558 ln BENEFIT 
[2.65] [0.77] [3.68] [-1.17]  [0.65] [0.24] 
ILOCONV  0.0068  0.0056 0.0074 0.0055 0.0066  0.0059
[4.93]  [4.52] [4.18] [3.55] [5.26]  [4.96]
-0.83  -0.92 -0.76 -0.88 -0.91  -0.97 ln COORDINATION 
[-9.50]  [-10.27] [-7.42] [-9.15] [-10.62]  [-10.55]
DENSITY  0.0027  0.006 -0.0005 0.003 0.0058  0.008
[4.91] [-0.33] [2.61] [4.18]  [5.72] [2.10] 
UNCOV 
ln INFL  -0.043  -0.094 -0.045 -0.11 -0.057  -0.093
[-1.68]  [-2.25] [-1.78] [-2.57] [-1.84]  [-2.13]
yes  yes yes yes yes  yes DUMMIES for years 
















2  0.73  0.75 0.73 0.78 0.72  0.71
RMSE  0.269  0.258 0.307 0.275 0.267  0.273
INST  INST H-W INST INST  INST METHOD 
Dependent variables are in logarithmic form.
t-statistics in paranthesis 





Regressions for the unemployment rates
Equations
Dependent variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
long term un. long term un. long term un. long term un.
Tax rate traditional subjective traditional subjective
Explanatory var.
ln TAXWEDGE  1.43 0.43
[3.81] [2.16]
ln STAXWEDGE 1.38 0.7
[6.06] [4.64]
ln BENEFIT 0.15 0.53 0.088 0.35
[0.95] [3.33] [0.66] [2.79]
ILOCONV 0.018 0.013 0.013 0.011
[5.45] [4.43] [5.36] [4.88]
ln COORDINATION -1.09 -1.35 -1.31 -1.4
[-4.88] [-5.90] [-8.42] [-8.74]
DENSITY 0.0006 0.0044 0.003 0.005
[0.84] [2.31] [1.62] [3.06]
UNCOV 0.82 0.64
[8.13] [6.81]
ln INFL -0.16 -0.28 -0.12 -0.19
[-2.46] [-3.43] [-2.74] [-3.61]
DUMMIES for years yes yes yes yes
n 103 103 103 103
R
2 0.71 0.78 0.83 0.87
RMSE 0.536 0.459 0.399 0.363
METHOD INST INST INST INST
Dependent variables are in logarithmic form.
t-statistics in paranthesis
















Regressions for the total employment rate
Equations
[1]  [2] [3] [4]  Dependent variables 
total emp. total emp. total emp. total emp.
Tax rate  traditional subjective subjective subjective
Explanatory var. 
ln TAXWEDGE  -5.6 
[-4.11]
-6.2 -8.5 ln STAXWEDGE 
[-5.65] [-8.48]
-3.2  ln CORPTAX 
[-3.61]
-3.8 -6.2  ln SCORPTAX 
[-5.05] [-7.21] 
ln BENEFIT  3.5  0.67 0.7 2.25 
[2.65] [0.65] [0.63] [1.96] 
ILOCONV  -0.065 -0.046 -0.043 -0.069 
[-3.23] [-2.67] [-2.43] [-4.19] 
 COORDINATION 2.85  2.92 3.1 2.6 
[10.12] [2.08] [11.14] [9.95] 
DENSITY  -0.006 -0.029 -0.013 -0.041 
[-0.295] [-1.75] [-0.72] [-2.30] 
UNCOV  -6.75 -4.9 -4.8 -6.7 
[-11.97] [-8.86] [-7.78] [-10.67]
-0.58 0.4 0.38 -0.25  ln INFL 
[-1.42] [1.14] [1.10] [-0.58] 
DUMMIES for years  yes  yes yes yes 





2  0.7833 0.86 0.84 0.83 
RMSE  3.99  3.24 3.43 3.57 
METHOD  INST INST INST INST 
t-statistics in paranthesis 







Regressions for the female employment rates 
Dependent variables  [1]  [3] [4] 





ln STAXWEDGE  -3.9 -8.1
[-2.24] [-4.71]
ln CORPTAX  -5.3
[-4.55]
ln SCORPTAX  -7 -8.4 
[-5.0] [-6.04] 
ln BENEFIT  5.4 2.4  
[2.70] [1.37] [1.18] [1.93] 
ILOCONV 
[-3.38] [ [ [
 COORDINATION
[7.15] [8.57] [ [8.15] 
DENSITY  0
UNCOV 
[-11.58] [-7.86] [-6.52] [-9.87] 
ln INFL 
[-0.905] [ [0.394] 











-0.1 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 
-2.71] -2.41] -3.41] 
3  3.1 3.4 3 
7.8]
0.044 0.026 .055 0.019 
[1.54] [0.99] [1.89] [0.72] 
-9.4 -6.8 -6.7 -7.9 
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Regressions for the male employment rate 
Equations
Dependent var.  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
male emp. male emp. male emp.  male emp.
Tax rate  traditional subjective subjective  subjective
Explanatory var.
ln TAXWEDGE  -9.7
[-7.84]
ln STAXWEDGE -7.6 -7.9
[-7.15] [-8.71]
ln CORPTAX  -0.97
[-0.905]
ln SCORPTAX  -0.57 -3.5 
[-0.489] [-3.64] 
ln BENEFIT  1.7 -0.5 -0.5 1.4 
[1.69] [0.534] [-0.528] [1.31] 
ILOCONV  -0.04 -0.033 -0.033 -0.06 
[-3.04] [-2.73] [-2.72] [-4.78] 
 COORDINATION  2.38 2.38 2.4 2 
[10.55] [10.87] [10.96] [6.81] 
DENSITY  -0.06 -0.086 -0.08 -0.1 
[-3.22] [-4.59] [-4.79] [-4.96] 
UNCOV  -3.6 -2.7 -2.7 -4.9 
[-7.59] [-5.053] [-5.02] [-8.1] 
ln INFL  -0.76 -0.066 -0.07 -0.87 
[-2.31] [-0.207] [-0.219] [-2.11] 
DUMMIES for years  yes yes yes yes 
n  114 114 114 114 
R 
2  0.77 0.8 0.8 0.73 
RMSE  3.31 3.1 3.1 3.6 
METHOD  INST INST INST INST 
29    
30 
T
Regressions for ployment rates
E tions
Dependent variables
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Figure 1 : Employement rates and the subjective tax wedge 
 















































































Figure 2 : Employment rates and the subjective corporate tax rate 
 















































































AGR: agricultural employment rate: ratio of employed persons in agriculture to the 
total employed people, per cent. Source: KILM (2001); World Development Indicators, 
2001. 
U: Unemployment rate: ratio of unemployed persons to the relevant labour force, per 
cent. Source: KILM (2001). 
UM: Male unemployment rate: ratio of male unemployed persons to the relevant 
labour force, per cent. Source: KILM (2001). 
UF: Female unemployment rate: ratio of female unemployed persons to the relevant 
labour force, per cent. Source: KILM (2001).  
E: Employment rate: ratio of employed persons to the working age population, per 
cent. Source: KILM (2001).  
EM: Male employment rate: ratio of male employed persons to the working age 
population, per cent. Source: KILM (2001). 
EF: Female employment rate: ratio of female employed persons to the working age 
population, per cent. Source: KILM (2001).  
SELF1: ratio of self-employed with unpaid family workers to the total employment, per 
cent. Source: KILM (2001). 
SELF2: ratio of self-employed to the total employment, per cent. Source: KILM (2001). 
NCOMETAX: Top income tax rate, per cent. Source: Friedman et al. (2000).  
INCOMETAX: Subjective income tax rate:  
CORPTAX: Statutory corporation tax rate, per cent. Source: Friedman et al. (2000) , 
KPMG Corporate tax database  
SCORPTAX: Subjective corporate tax rate 
TAXWEDGE: Tax wedge: Employees’ and employers’ social security contributions and 
personal income less transfer payment as a percentage of gross labour costs, paid by 
one earner married couple at APW wage level. Source: OECD (2001), Taxing Wages. 
STAXWEDGE: Subjective tax wedge 
CORRUPTION: Corruption Index: level of corruption ranked from a low of 10 to a high 
of 1. Source: Transparency International. 
BENEFIT: OECD summary measure of benefit entitlements: weighted average of the 
gross replacement rates over seven possible unemployment durations. Source: OECD 
(2002), Benefit and wages; Vodopivec, Wörgötter and Raju (2005). 
ILOCNV: ILO convention: Cumulative number of ILO conventions ratified by the 
country, based on legal documents. Source: Rama and Actecona (2002). 
COORDINATON: Coordination (employers + employees): the degrees of employer and 
union coordination are ranked from a low of 1 to a high of 3. Source: Riboud et al. 
(2002).  
DENSITY: Union density: percentage of salaried workers that belong to a union. 
Source: Riboud et al. (2002).  




COVERAGE: Union coverage index: 1: less than 25% of salaried workers are covered by 
collective agr re covered. 
Source: Riboud et al. (2002).  
hno linguistic fractionalization: Average value of five different indices of ethno 
ntifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial 
 of the population of the country that 
ude of the country, scaled to take values 
en economy, per cent of official GDP, Source: Schneider 
 in US dollar at PPP, OECD (2000). 
eements; 2: between 26 and 69% are covered, 3: 70% or more a
INFL: Inflation rates, per cent. Source: OECD (2000), Economic Outlook. 
EF: Et
linguistic fractionalization. Its value ranges from 0 to 1. Source: La Porta (1999).  
ENGLISH: Legal origin: Ide
Code of each country. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).   
PROT: Protestant religion: The percentage
belongs to the protestant religion. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
LAT: Latitude: The absolute value of the latit
between 0 and 1. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
HIDDEN: The size of the hidd
(2000, 2002)  
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